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Abstract
This paper estimates the extent of intergenerational income mobility in Japan among
sons and daughters born between 1935 and 1975. Our estimates rely on a two-sample
instrumental variables approach using representative data from the Japanese Social Strat-
ication and Mobility (SSM) surveys, collected between 1965 and 2005. Father's income
is predicted on the basis of a rich set of variables including education, occupation and job
characteristics and we discuss changes in the Japanese earnings structure for cohorts born
between the early 1900s and the 1960s. Our main results indicate that the intergenerational
income elasticity (IGE) in Japan is around .3 for both sons and daughters, a rather low
gure in comparative perspective. We discuss the sensitivity of the IGE to using either
personal or family income as the income variable for both fathers and children. Laslty, we
also examine changes across cohorts in the IGE, as well as the existence of non-linearities
in the intergenerational transmission of income. Results indicate that intergenerational
mobility has been roughly stable over the last decades and point to a convex relationship
between parental income and child's achievement.
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Over the last fteen years, an abundant literature has analyzed the extent of intergenera-
tional economic mobility and has revealed that in many developed countries a large frac-
tion of economic inequality is transmitted from one generation to the next, within families
(Solon 1999, Black & Devereux 2010). While available evidence has contributed to a rich de-
scription of the extent of intergenerational transmission, the mechanisms responsible for this
transmission remain largely unstudied. In particular, although it has been demonstrated that
more equal countries also exhibit more intergenerational mobility, as discussed for instance in
Bj orklund & J antti (2009), the contribution of key ingredients of the mobility process, such
as such labor market institutions, wage inequality and educational institutions is still, from
an empirical perspective, unclear. To this end, the gathering of international evidence on the
extent of intergenerational mobility in countries with dierent social and economic structure
appears as an important rst step. Another important limitation of existing evidence, however,
in this perspective, is that it has, until recently, mostly focused on western developed countries
and much less is known about the extent of intergenerational mobility in other parts of the
world, including Asian countries. The objective of this paper is to ll in this gap and to mea-
sure the extent of intergenerational income mobility in Japan. Our analysis relies on the Social
Stratication and Mobility (SSM) survey, a rich survey conducted between 1955 and 2005 that
gathers information on individual income as well as family and social background and allows us
to estimate the intergenerational income elasticity for Japan using a two-sample instrumental
variables approach. We examine mobility between fathers and their sons and daughters for
cohorts of children born between 1935 and 1975.
Several characteristics of Japan make it an interesting case for the study of intergenera-
tional earnings mobility, in particular from a cross-country comparative perspective. First,
Japan is often seen as a fairly equal society characterized by compressed income dierentials
and limited poverty. Indeed, this image seems largely sustained empirically, at least compared
to other countries and until the increase in inequality that occurred in the 1990s (Gottschalk &
Smeeding 2000, Tachibanaki 2009).1 The extent to which this high degree of income and, more
generally, social equality translates into a high level of economic mobility is of course an impor-
tant question, both for the comprehension of contemporary Japan and for the understanding
of the intergenerational income mobility process. In this respect, opposing views can be found.
On the one hand, occupational and educational success are often thought, at least in Japanese
1Whether Japan still is, in the most recent period, an \equal" society seems highly debatable, as discussed in
Tachibanaki (2009).
1popular views, to depend little on family origin. On the other hand, Japan is characterized by a
strongly dierentiated and very competitive educational system, where success at entering the
most prestigious universities, largely conditions future labor market prospects and henceforth
motivates considerable nancial investment by the parents. As a consequence, one would expect
family background to strongly inuence individual outcomes. Which view is the most relevant
is the key question addressed in this paper.
Evidence on the extent of intergenerational economic mobility in Japan is currently rather
limited, in comparison to the vast literature that has focused on social and educational mobility
(e.g. Ishida 1993, Ojima 1998, Imada 2000, Kondo 2000). To our knowledge, only two papers
have examined the extent of intergenerational income mobility in Japan.2 Lefranc, Ojima &
Yoshida (2008) provided a rst assessment. As the present paper, it relies on the SSM dataset,
i.e. a large representative data set covering the second half of the twentieth century. But the
analysis is limited to father-son pairs and the prediction of fathers income rests on a narrow set
of individual characteristics. Ueda (2009) oers estimates of intergenerational income elasticities
for male and female based on the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers. While the author tries
to account for the possible biases induced, this data set suers several weaknesses. In particular,
the sample only covers the most recent period and children are observed in the early stages of
their life-cycle. Parents on the contrary are observed at the same time as children which implies
that for many of them, measured income corresponds to either their end of career income or
their retirement income. Lastly, non-married men, who account for about 25% of the adult
population are excluded from the data. All in all, these problems may inuence the results and
lead to unrepresentative estimates.
The main contribution of our paper is to oer a robust and in-depth analysis of intergen-
erational income mobility in Japan among sons and daughters. We measure mobility by the
now standard intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE), which can be obtained by regressing
the log of individual annual earnings on the log of their father's earnings. In the lack of direct
observation of father's income, we use a two-sample instrumental variables approach as in e.g.
Bj orklund & J antti (1997). Father's income is predicted on the basis of a rich set of variables
including education, occupation and job characteristics. The SSM data set used in this paper
allows us to measure intergenerational mobility for a representative sample of children born
between 1935 and 1975 and we also examine changes across cohorts in the IGE. Incidentally,
the prediction of father's income requires us to assess changes in Japanese earnings structure
2A third paper is that of Yoshida (2008) but it is only available in Japanese.
2for a large set of cohorts born between the early 1900s and the 1960s, using income data for
the years 1965 to 1995. So an important by-product of this study is to document long-term
trends in the Japanese earnings structure. We also perform several robustness analysis. First,
our data includes two distinct measures of income : the rst one refers to the individual's own
income; the second to his or her family income. Having both measures allows in particular to
isolate the contribution of marital outcomes to the intergenerational mobility process and we
examine the sensitivity of the IGE to the income measure used in the analysis. Lastly, we also
examine the existence of non-linearities in the intergenerational transmission process.
The main result of our analysis is that intergenerational income elasticity in Japan is around
.3, which is a rather low gure in comparative perspective. This elasticity is rather similar for
sons and daughters. It is constant over time for sons. For daughters, the time dynamics are a
bit more complex but mobility also appears roughly stable. Lastly, in the case of sons, their
overall family income seems less related to parental income than their own individual incoming,
suggesting that marital sorting dampens slightly the intergenerational persistence of inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the estimation procedure and
the data used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the results of the rst-step estimation (section
3.1), and discusses our estimates of the extent of intergenerational mobility among sons (section
3.2) and among daughters (section 3.3). Section 4 concludes.
2 Estimation method and data
2.1 Estimation method
Most of the economic analysis of intergenerational mobility focuses on estimating the IGE in
permanent (or long-term) earnings. This elasticity is given by the coecient  in the following
intergenerational regression model :
Yi = 0 + Xi + i (1)
where Yi denotes the log of individual i's long-term earnings Xi denotes his father's long-term
earnings. As abundantly discussed in the literature,  should not be seen as a structural
parameter measuring the causal eect of parental resources on child's earnings, but rather as
a "catch-all" descriptive measure of the intergenerational association in earnings, capturing all
possible channels of transmission.
3Direct estimation of equation 1 requires a considerable wealth of information. Not only
does it call for a linked data set in which both father and child's earnings are observed but
it furthermore requires one to observe a time-series of individual earnings in order to measure
long-term earnings. Very few data sets satisfy this data requisite.
Without such data,  can be estimated using a two-sample instrumental variables (TSIV),
an approach originally derived in Angrist & Krueger (1995) and Arellano & Meghir (1992).
This method was rst applied to the estimation of the IGE by Bj orklund & J antti (1997). The
basic principle behind TSIV estimation is to replace Xi in equation 1 by a prediction ^ Xi formed
on the basis of some observable father's characteristics, Zi.
The data requirements for TSIV estimation are signicantly less stringent. The prediction
is derived from a rst-step equation which is estimated on a sample that is representative of the
fathers' population, and in which we observe both earnings and the characteristics Zi. Given
the estimation of the rst step, the data requirement for the estimation of  is to observe both
child's income and father's characteristics.
TSIV has been extensively used for the estimation of the IGE and its properties are discussed
in several papers including Solon (1999) and Nicoletti & Ermisch (2008). These properties
depend on the choice of the instrument. If the instrument only aects child's earnings through its
eect on father's earnings, the estimation of  is consistent. Indeed, in this case TSIV estimation
oers the signicant advantage of over-riding the attenuation bias that typically arises, because
of classical measurement errors, when estimating equation 1 with long-term earnings replaced by
current earnings (Solon 1992, Zimmerman 1992, Mazumder 2001)). However, if the instrument
has a direct eect on the child's outcome, than the TSIV estimates are biased and the direction
of the bias depends on the sign of the direct eect. For most of the instruments used here, the
expectation is that the direct eect will be positive, hence resulting in an overestimation of the
IGE. However, in practice, the order of magnitude of this overestimation turns out to be small,
as discussed in Bj orklund & J antti (1997).
Another important source of bias in the estimation of the IGE is what has been referred
to as the life-cycle bias (Jenkins 1987, Grawe 2006, Haider & Solon 2006). This bias arises
when using current (usually annual) earnings instead of permanent earnings in the estimation
of the IGE. In the presence of individual heterogeneity in earnings growth over the life-cycle,
current earnings measures permanent earnings with error. Furthermore, it can be shown that
the error is not of the classical type and is correlated with both true permanent earnings and
age.3 As a result, dierences in current earnings across individuals will in general provide a
3The classical measurement error case refer to the situation where measurement error is independent of the
4biased estimate of permanent income dierentials. Since age-earnings proles are steeper for
high income individuals, current income dierentials, measured at an early stage of the life-cycle,
will underestimate permanent income dierentials; current income at the end of the life-cycle
will over-estimate permanent income dierentials.
This form of measurement error will introduce an asymmetric bias in the estimation of ,
depending on whether child or father's earnings are aected by this form of measurement error.
Using current earnings early (resp. late) in the life-cycle, as a proxy for child's permanent
earnings will lead to underestimate (resp. overestimate) . Conversly, using current earnings
early (resp. late) in the life-cycle, as a proxy for father's permanent earnings will lead to
overestimate (resp. underestimate) the IGE.
To account for life-cycle biases, we follow Lee & Solon (2009) and introduce control for age
and an interaction between age and father's income and use the following specication for the
second-step equation :
Yit = t +  ^ Xi + f(ageit)  ^ Xi + g(ageit) + eit (2)
where i and t are indices for individual and time. c denotes the ve-year birth cohort of
individual i. The ts denote time dummies and f and g are respectively second and fourth
order polynomial functions in age.4 ^ Xi is predicted father's earnings at age 40; the variable age
is normalized to zero at age 40.
Let us now turn to the rst-step equation. Its purpose is to predict father's income at the
age of 40 on the basis of father's education, occupation and job characteristics. In practice, we
face two major issues in the specication of this equation. First, some cohorts, in particular
the oldest ones, are observed far away from their mid-career. Hence, to accurately predict
earnings dierentials at age 40 we need to account for heterogeneity in age-earnings proles.
This is done by introducing group-specic age-earnings proles where groups are dened on
the basis of their education and employment status.5 Second, given the large time and cohort
interval used the estimation, the earnings function should allow for changes across cohorts in
the earnings premium attached to the dierent characteristics. This is done by introducing
interactions between the eect of some of the characteristics and a quadratic cohort trend.6 In
true value.
4In principle, the use of polynomial function for age would allow to simultaneously include time and cohort
dummies. Cohort dummies however turn out to be insignicant when added to this specication and their
inclusion does not aect the results.
5A larger set of interaction terms could be introduced, such as occupation-age interactions. In practice, they
turned out to be non-signicant.
6The characteristics whose eects are allowed to vary across cohorts are age, education and self-employment
5the end, the rst-step model we estimate can be summarized by the following equation :
Xict = t + (Zic;c) +  (ageict;Zic;c) + eict (3)
where i;c;t are indices for individual, cohort and date; Zic are the father's permanent charac-
teristics,  captures the eect of these characteristics, which is allowed to vary with c;   denotes
the heterogenous age prole.
Lastly, predicted father's earnings is given by :
^ Xict = ^ (Zic;c) (4)
2.2 Data
Our data come from the Social Stratication and Social Mobility (SSM) surveys. The SSM
survey has been the primary data source for studies of social and educational mobility in Japan
(Ishida 1993, Ojima 1998, Imada 2000). The rst wave of the survey was conducted in 1955
by the Japanese Sociological Society. Since then, similar surveys were conducted at intervals of
ten years. The earliest waves (1955, 1965 and 1975) focused only on males. A female sample
was collected since the 1985 survey. The questionnaire of the last wave of the survey (2005) has
also been used for similar surveys in Korea and Taiwan.
The SSM samples are designed to provide a national representative sample of the population
between 20 and 70 years old. Across the dierent waves, the size of the male sample varies
between two and three thousands individuals. The questionnaire focuses on the description of
social status, educational attainment, social origin, class identication and the perception of
inequality. The most important variables in our analysis are income, which is the main variable
of interest, and educational and occupational attainment, which serve to predict father's income
in the rst-step equation. Respondents to the SSM survey are asked to report their income,
education, occupation and job characteristics as well as the education, occupation and job
characteristics of their father. As often the case, father's information is reported ex post by the
survey respondent and refer to father's main occupation.
All SSM waves record two distinct measures of income. The rst one is individual own
income. The second one is family total income. In both cases, the variable measures annual
primary income, in the year preceding the survey, before any tax or transfer and includes both
labor and asset income. Furthermore, income information is available for both salaried and
status. Other interaction terms turned out to be non-signicant.
6self-employed workers. For most individuals of working age and who actually work, the primary
component of pre-sc income is labor earnings. Family income is the total of each family
member's individual income in the respondent's household. Income is available in all waves of
the survey in bracketed form, except for 1965 where income is coded continuously. The bounds
and number of brackets vary across waves, between 17 and 30 main brackets. Higher income
are not top-coded though and a response beyond the top category was coded continuously.
In the regressions, we assign the mid-value of the bracket and use standard linear regression
techniques.7
The education classication used in the dierent waves of the survey varies across waves
and cohort, reecting the changes in the Japanese educational system that occurred over the
last century. For older cohorts, the classication distinguishes between ve educational levels:
elementary school (6 years of formal schooling), upper elementary (8 years), middle school (11
years), college (14 years) and university (17 years). For more recent cohorts, the ve educa-
tional levels are: junior high school (9 years), high School (12 years), junior college (14 years),
university (16 years) and graduate school (18 years). Given sample size and to assure cross-year
consistency of the education classication, we used a reduced classication that distinguishes
between three educational levels: lower secondary education (or lower), upper secondary educa-
tion and tertiary education. This corresponds, for instance, to the classication used in Kondo
(2000).
Social status is coded using the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) classication. We
use a variant of the classication in 9 groups, since a change of the questionnaire about the
number of employees between 1985 and 1995 makes us impossible to distinguish between IVa
(Small employer) and IVb (Independent) (Kanomata, Tanabe & Takenoshita 2008). In the end
we use the following eight-categories : I- Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and ocials,
managers in large industrial establishments, large proprietors; II - Lower-grade professionals,
administrators, and ocials; higher-grade technicians, supervisors of non-manual employees;
III- Routine non-manual employees, higher grade (administration and commerce) and lower
grade (sales and services); IV- small proprietors and self-employed workers ; V- Lower-grade
technicians supervisors of manual workers; VI- Skilled manual workers; VII- Semi- and unskilled
manual workers; VIII - Farmers and farm workers. In addition to social status, SSM also includes
additional characteristics of occupation and job position. We use rm size and an indicator of
self-employment status.
7Lefranc et al. (2008) uses interval regression to deal with the bracketed form of income and show that the
impact on the estimated IGE is negligible.
7In the main samples used in this paper to estimate both the rst- and the second-step
equations, we exclude those without positive earnings in the year preceding the survey. The
sample used in the estimation of the rst-step equation draws on ve available survey waves,
1965, 1975, 1985 and 2005. The reason for excluding 1955 is that income information is missing
in that wave for farmers who accounts for a large share of the employment in older cohorts.
The sample is restricted to individuals aged 30 to 59 years old. The main reason for excluding
individuals older than age 60, is that many people in this sample start retiring and living on
pension from this age in Japan, a problem also encountered in the study of Ueda (2009).
Second-step estimations are based on the three most recent waves (1985, 1995 and 2005).8
For reasons already discussed, the children sample is restricted to individuals aged between 30
and 50 years old, i.e. close to the middle of their working career. For each individual in the
second-step sample, we form a prediction of his father's income using estimates of the rst-step
equation. The prediction is based on reported father's education, EGP classications, residential
area and other occupational information. In most cases, individual in the second-step sample
report their father's birth year. In this case, we use the relevant age-specic returns to education
to predict father's income. When information on father's birth year is not available, we predict
fathers income on the basis of the observed distribution of father's birth cohort, conditional on
child's birth cohort. Mean values in the samples are presented in table 1.
3 Results
3.1 First-step estimates and long-term trends in income inequality in
Japan
First-step estimates are presented in table 2 for both personal and family income. These es-
timates are based on the sample representative of the fathers cohorts and include only male.
The rst salient result that emerge from this table is the relatively limited extent of earnings
dierentials across the various groups. For instance, the gap betweeen the two extremes of the
social ladder, higher-grade professionals and farmers, is less than .7 log points. Similarly, the
dierence between the low- and high-education groups is less than .2 log points. Of course,
the ceteris paribus analysis of the coecients is largely articial given the collinearity of the
dierent dimensions but even if we cumulate the above mentioned earnings gaps, they lead
8The reason for not using earlier waves of the SSM for the second-step is that women are only interviewed
starting in 1985. Furthermore, some information on family background is missing or not recoded homogenously
before 1985.
8to modest earnings dierentials, in comparison to what can be found in other countries. An
interesting comparison can be established with the results of Lefranc & Trannoy (2005) who
use similar approach and classications. In the case of France, which is often thought to occupy
an intermediate position among developed countries in terms of earnings inequality, they nd a
gap between the top and bottom social groups of .9 to 1 log points and of .3 to .4 between top
and bottom education groups.
In contrast to occupation and education, employment characteristics lead to non-negligible
earnings dierentials. For instance, the benet of being employed in a large rm is larger than
the income gap between the high- and low-education groups. Self-employment status positively
aects income and has a signicant eect. Lastly, the main eect of the socio-demographic and
employment characteristics tends to be higher in the case of personal income than in the case
of family income. This result is indeed rather intuitive since we should expect other family
members' income to be less correlated to the individual's characteristics than his own income.
The only exception is self-employment that has a stronger impact on family than on personal
income. One possible explanation is that the wives of self-employed are associated often also
employed as family workers in family-owned businesses, an activity from which they would
derive an income higher than the average female income.
The second part of table 2 reports the estimated age-earnings proles by level of education
and self-employment status. In the specication of the rst-step equation, we only included
a quadratic function of age since higher-order terms were not signicant. We also present the
age-earnings prole in gure 1, panel A. As expected, the slope of age-earnings proles increases
markedly with education. At the beginning of individual careers, the income eect of 10 years
of individual experience amounts to about .3 log points for individuals with higher education
against about .2 for individuals with secondary education or less. On the contrary, the income-
age prole of self-employed individuals appears, other things equal, atter than that of other
groups.
Lastly, table 2 and gure 1, panel B, report the estimated changes across cohort in the eect
of education and self-employment status. The eects reported are based on the assumption of
a quadratic cohort trend. We also estimated variants of the rst-step equation with piece-wise
linear trends. The results were very similar. Trends across cohorts indicate a compression of
earnings dierentials in the long-run. First we observe a fall in the geographic income gaps.
Second, the income gap between the bottom education group and the top two decreases from a
high value of about .5 log points for cohorts born at the beginning of the twentieth century to
9a low value of about .2 for cohorts born after World War II. This reduction of the education-
income gap is non-linear over the period and occurs for the most part between cohorts born in
the early century and cohorts born around WWII. In contrast, earning gaps are rather constant
across cohorts born in the 1945-1965 interval. This time pattern roughly coincides with the
pace of educational expansion that occurred in Japan throughout the twentieth century. As
shown in gure 2, educational attainment rised markedly over this period, with the bulk of the
educational expansion occurring between the early century cohorts and the cohorts born in the
late 1940s. At the end of our period, the downward trend in earnings dierentials seems inverted
and we observed a slight increase in earnings inequality.9 This small rise in inequality is however
much smaller than the one documented in Tachibanaki (2009). It may be due in particular to
the fact that our rst-step equation is estimated on a sample of males aged between 30 and 59
and born before 1975, who were less aected by the rise in earnings inequality.
3.2 Intergenerational income mobility for sons
Main results Our main estimates of intergenerational economic mobility for sons in Japan
are given in columns (1) to (3) of table 3. Altogether, they suggest a value of the IGE around
.35, although the value varies slightly with the variables used to measure children and fathers
incomes. Most values reported in international assessment of the intergenerational mobility are
estimated using personal labor income and are thus largely comparable to our estimate in column
(1), which is based on reports of both father's and son's personal income. The major discrepancy
in the measurement of income, between the data used in column (1) and most international
estimates is the inclusion of asset income in our measure of personal income. Strictly speaking,
estimates in column (1) represent an average of the intergenerational elasticity for labor earnings
and for asset income, weighted by the contribution of both sources to personal income. Previous
estimates indicate that the intergenerational elasticity for wealth is signicantly larger than for
labor earnings (e.g. Mulligan 1997). So for the purpose of international comparisons of the
extent of the mobility in the personal labor earnings, the gure of .33, in column (1), should
be seen as an upper bound estimate of the elasticity in Japan. Of course, the order of over-
estimation is probably rather small, given the share of asset income in overall income.
Compared to column (1), column (2) regresses sons' personal income on the overall family
income of their parents. Measuring parental economic status by means of the total family
9One may suspect that this small positive trend is articially induced by the choice of a quadratic specication
for cohort eects. In fact, it is clearly not the case and the specication of piece-wise linear trends with a break
around cohort 1945 also indicate an increase of education income dierentials at the end of the period.
10income, instead of the sole father's income leads to a slightly higher IGE of .37 (instead of .33).
This suggests that total family income may better capture the broad nexus of factors that shape
individual success. This conrms results already obtained in several other papers. In fact, in
Japan, the gap between the two estimates appears smaller than what has been found in other
countries, for instance the United States. For this country, Solon (1992) indicates a dierence
in the estimated IGE using both measures of .09, with the IGEs being respectively .39 and .48
when using father's earnings or family income.10
Lastly column (3) provides estimates of the IGE based on the regression of sons' family
income on their parents' family income. Compared with estimated in column (2), since family
income aggregates the income of both spouses, estimates based on this variable will reect both
the inuence of assortative mating on mobility, and the direct intergenerational transmission
between parents and children.11 More precisely, as discussed in Chadwick & Solon (2002), the
estimated IGE in column (3) is the weighted average of (i) the intergenerational elasticity of
son's own income to his parents' family income and (ii) the elasticity of his spouse's personal
income to the son's parents' income, where the weights are given by the share of each of the
two spouses' income in the total family income. Using family income (column 3) rather than
personal income (column 2) as a dependant variable reduces the IGE from .37 to .30. This
suggests a relatively low elasticity between the wife's own income and her parents-in-law family
resources. Ermisch, Francesconi & Siedler (2006) report similar results for the US.
Comparison with previous estimates Overall, our results point to a value for the IGE for
sons in Japan slightly higher than .3. This represents an intermediate degree of intergenerational
mobility, compared to other developed countries. The results found here also dier slightly from
previous results obtained for Japan. First, the IGE reported in table 3 are slightly higher than
those reported in our previous study (Lefranc et al. 2008), which largely excluded self-employed
workers from the analysis and suggested a value of the IGE in the inteval 0.22-0.31. Second our
results are also signicantly lower than those of Ueda (2009) who reports an IGE for men in the
interval 0.41{0.46. Several dierences in the sample selection procedure are likely to account for
this discrepancy. First, for males, the results of Ueda only concern married individuals, since
single men, who represent about 30% of the relevant population, are excluded from the Japanese
10Other evidence on the incidence of the measure of family economic status in the US can be found in Altonji
& Dunn (1991) and Mulligan (1997). Our ndings of a smaller gap between the IGEs nd using both variables
may be partly attributable to the fact that our measure of father's income, contrary to earnings measures used
in the US, already incorporates the asset earnings of the father.
11For unmarried individuals, family income will typically coincides with individual income, except in the rare
case of individuals living with parents or relatives.
11Panel Survey of Consumers that she uses.12 If there is selection into the marriage market this
will bias her estimates, presumably downward though. Second, income is observed at the same
time for children and parents. Hence children are observed fairly early in their life-cycle and
parents are observed fairly late. Ueda accounts for possible life-cycle biases by controlling
for age eects but this strategy is only valid if the earnings structure has remained constant
over time. On the contrary, section 3.1 indicates that earnings dierentials have diminished
over time. So other things equal, this implies that end of life-cycle observations may lead to
underestimate inequality among parents and consequently overestimate the IGE. The fact that
some parents have already started collecting a pension will also presumably go in the same
direction of underestimating inequality among parents and the overstating the IGE.
Sensitivity analysis We performed two main tests of sensitivity of our results to changes
in the specication. First we examined the possibility of changes over time in the value of the
IGE. To this end, we interact our measure of predicted father's income with a dummy variable
equal one for cohorts born after 1952. The choice of the cut-o date roughly splits our sample
in two equal-sized groups and allows to separate the most recent cohorts who entered the labor
market after the period of high economic expansion that followed World War II. Results are
given in columns (4) to (6). They indicate that the IGE was remarkably stable across cohorts
over the period studied here. This converges with the results of Ishida & Miwa (2008) who nd
that social mobility has remained stable in Japan in the second half of the twentieth century.
Second, we also tested for the presence of non-linearities in the relationship between father
and son's income. This is done by regressing child's income on a polynomial function of the log
of father's income. Columns (7) to (9) report the estimates obtained when using a quadratic
function of father's income, for the dierent combination of measures of child's and father's
income. We also tried using cubic and quartic expansions of father's income. Results are given
in gure 3. When focusing on son's own income, we do not nd any compelling evidence of
a non-linear relationship. Higher-order terms of father's predicted income never turn out to
be signicant and the predicted relationship always lies very close to the linear prediction.13
However, a convex relationship appears when using family income as the explained variable,
which points to a non-linearity in the eect of assortative mating, the association between son's
parental income and wife's income being higher at the top of the income distribution than at
12According to the 2005 census, 30% of men between 30 year old and 59 year old and 25% of women are single.
13This is similar to the results reported for the US and UK by Bratsberg, Red, Raaum, Naylor, J antti,
Eriksson &  Osterbacka (2007), although the same study also documents a convex relationship in Nordic country
that may partly account for the low overall IGE in Scandinavia.
12the bottom. We now turn to the analysis of intergenerational transmission for daughters.
3.3 Intergenerational income mobility for daughters
Main results Our main estimates of the intergenerational elasticity for daughters are given
in table 4, columns (1) to (5). OLS estimates of the IGE for own income appear particularly
low, with a value below .2. One should however note that personal income is missing for about
40% of our daughters sample. This may in particular result from non-participation to the labor
market. If the non-report of personal income is related to parental income, estimates in column
(1) are unrepresentative. Thus, in column (2), we re-estimate the IGE using Heckman's sample
selection model. In the selection equation, an indicator for the report of income is regressed
on marital status, indicators of the number of children, spouse's income and education when
married, as well as age prole and year indicators. Overall, the results in column (2) indicate
negative sample selection : women with the greatest income potential are less likely to report
their own income, because of lower participation to the labor market, which leads OLS to
underestimate the extent of the IGE. Once sample selection is taken into consideration, the
IGE rises to a value of slightly lower than .3, which is indeed very comparable to the one found
for sons.
Columns (4) and (5) report the same exercise for the combination of daughter's family
income and parental family income. In this case, taking sample selection into account does not
aect the measured IGE. In the sequel, we only report results derived from the sample selection
model.
As in the case of sons, the IGE appears slightly higher when regressing child's income on
total parental income rather than father's personal income. However, contrary to what we nd
for men, the IGE is not sensitive to whether daughter's income is measured by personal income
(.313 in column (3)) or by family income (.314 in column (5)). In the light of the model developed
by Chadwick & Solon (2002), this rst suggests a rather high correlation between daughter's
parents' income and her husband's own income. Compared to what we found for sons, this
points to a gender asymmetry in the elasticity of own income to parents-in-law's income. This
asymmetry could largely be explained by a more compressed earnings distribution for daughter's
in Japan, together with gender neutral correlation in the characteristics of spouses and their
in-laws.
Sensitivity analysis As in the case of sons, we also check for the presence of changes across
cohorts in the intergenerational transmission of earnings as well as non-linearities in the trans-
13mission process. Results for the presence of non-linearities are given in columns (9) to (11).
All in all, squared-income and higher order terms are never signicant. The graphs presented
in gure 3, panels A and B, go in the same direction and suggest that the relationship be-
tween parental income and adult income - both personal and family income - can be adequately
summarized by a linear relationship.
Results for changes across cohorts are given in colums (6) to (8), in table 4. At rst sight,
they indicate opposing results, depending on the variable one uses to measure daughter's income.
When using daughter's personal income, as in column (6), the striking result that emerges is
not only that the IGE for recent cohorts is markedly higher for cohorts born after 1952, but,
most importantly, that the value of the IGE for daughters born before 1952 is not signicantly
dierent from zero. Consequently, the results in column (6) prima facie suggest a drastic switch
from a regime where the intergenerational transmission of inequality was by and large absent,
contrary to what was observed for sons, to a new situation where intergenerational mobility is
substantially lower, and in fact lower than for sons.
This image is largely misleading and results from the specicities of the female labor market
in Japan. For women born before 1952, employment concentrates in low-status and low-wage
occupations, so called 'pink-collar' jobs, where the status attainment process is very limited
compared with men (Imada 1998) with little promotion perspectives (Suzuki 2005). A large
share of part-time work is also observed, together with a high share of family employment. This
leads to a fairly compressed wage structure that will be reected directly into a low IGE. But
the primary meaning of this low IGE is that labor market status in general, and own income
in particular, represents a poor proxy of social status and mobility for women in the older
cohort, given in particular the small share of women's personal income in the overall family
income.14 At the same time, for that same cohort, family background is very highly correlated
to the family income earned in adulthood as well as with several over dimensions of individual
attainment, such a education. And column 8 indicates that the intergenerational elasticity
for family income essentially stayed unchanged across cohorts, and, if anything, has declined
slightly for more recent cohorts.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the extent of intergenerational transmission of income inequality
for sons and daughters in Japan. Our estimates suggests that a value of the IGE around
14For our two cohort groups, this share amounts respectively to an average of .2 and .22.
14.3 adequately summarizes the persistence of inequality between fathers and children for both
sons and daughters. Overall, this value puts Japan in an intermediate position, compared to
other developed countries, on the scale of intergenerational mobility. For instance, among the
countries surveyed in Bj orklund & J antti (2009), Japan appears more mobile than the United
States, the United Kingdom, Italy and France, all of which exhibit an IGE greater than .4,
comparable to Germany but less mobile than Scandinavian countries, Australia and Canada.
At rst sight, this rather high degree of mobility may seem hard to reconcile with the alleged
importance of parental investment in child's education at work in Japan. As already abundantly
described in several studies, access to higher education in Japan is often expensive and selective,
forcing family to elaborate complex educational strategies and to undertake signicant nancial
investments to support them. For instance families cover between 71 and 86 % of the annual
expenditures of university students (Kondo 2000). Furthermore, besides tuition fees, parents
often invest signicant amounts in\shadow education"such as cram schools and private tutoring.
Two factors, however are likely to limit the incidence of these investments for the trans-
mission of income across generations. Both factors, emphasize the role of compressed earnings
dierentials, but at dierent stages of the intergenerational mobility process. The rst argu-
ment emphasizes the small degree of inequality among Japanese parents. In such a context,
even if parents invest a large share of their income in their children's education, in the end, the
resulting distribution of human capital in the next generation will also be relatively equal. This
is conrmed by the analysis of \shadow education" undertaken in Stevenson & Baker (1992),
who emphasize the following three aspects of private investment in education in Japan. First,
family nancial investment is high on average. Second, such investment is ecient at improving
educational attainment. But third, nancial investment and the use of shadow education seem
to vary little with characteristics of the family background such as parental education or family
income. The second argument applies to the end of the intergenerational transmission process.
As discussed for instance in Solon (2004), lower returns to human capital, as seems to be the
case in Japan compared to most developed countries, will translate into a lower IGE and limit
the income consequences of inequalities of parental investment.
Part of the high degree of intergenerational mobility observed in our sample may also be
explained by the specicities of the high economic expansion period that develop after World
War II. Of course, the high aggregate growth that Japan experienced in this period came along
with a wave of rapid industrial development and occupational change that may have fostered
intergenerational mobility. However, it is important to stress that our results do not suggest any
15slowdown in the mobility process for the cohorts of children born after 1952 and who entered
the labor market after the high-growth era. Whether this relatively high degree of mobility will
be maintained in the face of the recent rise in earnings inequality described in for instance in
Tachibanaki (2009) is of course an open question.
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19Table 2: First-step estimates
(1) (2)
ln(individual income) ln(family income)
EGP class I REF REF
EGP class II -0.205*** (0.0239) -0.149*** (0.0234)
EGP class III -0.430*** (0.0275) -0.302*** (0.0270)
EGP class IV -0.422*** (0.0285) -0.394*** (0.0277)
EGP class V -0.292*** (0.0301) -0.221*** (0.0295)
EGP class VI -0.522*** (0.0290) -0.408*** (0.0285)
EGP class VII -0.545*** (0.0268) -0.422*** (0.0264)
EGP class VIII -0.680*** (0.0326) -0.571*** (0.0318)
primary or lower sec. education REF REF
upper secondary education 0.134*** (0.0238) 0.135*** (0.0233)
higher education 0.185*** (0.0293) 0.174*** (0.0287)
rm size : >1000 0.263*** (0.0177) 0.198*** (0.0172)
rm size : government 0.131*** (0.0216) 0.128*** (0.0211)
self-employed 0.174*** (0.0293) 0.262*** (0.0286)
residential area : 6 major cities REF REF
residential area : urban -0.0769*** (0.0235) -0.0221 (0.0228)
residential area : rural -0.117*** (0.0264) 0.00367 (0.0257)
age  prim./low.sec. educ. 0.0135*** (0.00297) 0.0111*** (0.00303)
age  upper secondary educ. 0.0156*** (0.00287) 0.0126*** (0.00290)
age  higher educ. 0.0225*** (0.00322) 0.0146*** (0.00322)
age  self-employed -0.000332 (0.00255) 0.0000385 (0.00249)
age
2  prim./low.sec. educ. -0.000414* (0.000231) -0.000139 (0.000228)
age
2  upper secondary educ. -0.000513*** (0.000190) -0.000290 (0.000191)
age
2  higher educ. -0.000564** (0.000229) -0.000277 (0.000229)
age
2  self-employed -0.000445** (0.000207) -0.000361* (0.000202)
cohort  age 0.0000983 (0.000189) -0.0000382 (0.000198)
cohort  age
2 0.00000894 (0.0000110) -0.00000493 (0.0000110)
cohort  upper secondary educ. -0.00227 (0.00159) -0.00399** (0.00173)
cohort  higher educ. -0.00190 (0.00173) -0.00190 (0.00186)
cohort  self-employed -0.00401*** (0.00119) -0.00266** (0.00120)
cohort  residential area : urban 0.00291** (0.00134) 0.00251* (0.00134)
cohort  residential area : rural 0.00607*** (0.00154) 0.00736*** (0.00158)
cohort
2  age 0.00000834 (0.00000553) 0.00000853 (0.00000565)
cohort
2  age
2 -0.000000460 (0.000000363) -0.000000249 (0.000000368)
cohort
2  upper secondary educ. 0.000149** (0.0000679) 0.0000527 (0.0000726)
cohort
2  higher educ. 0.000179** (0.0000784) 0.000175** (0.0000825)
cohort
2  self-employed -0.0000867 (0.0000547) -0.0000434 (0.0000548)
cohort
2  residential area : urban -0.0000717 (0.0000672) -0.000102 (0.0000671)
cohort
2  residential area : rural -0.000160** (0.0000748) -0.000192** (0.0000757)
year 1975 0.466*** (0.0274) 0.475*** (0.0266)
year 1985 0.584*** (0.0379) 0.630*** (0.0372)
year 1995 0.708*** (0.0507) 0.834*** (0.0514)
year 2005 0.569*** (0.0799) 0.697*** (0.0847)
Constant 5.731*** (0.0394) 5.764*** (0.0384)
Observations 7170 6814
R-squared 0.459 0.452
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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